Explanatory style and gambling: How pessimists respond to losing wagers by Atlas, Gordon D. & Peterson, Christopher
Behav. Res. l-her. Vol. 28, No. 6. pp. 523-529. 1990 C005-7967/90 S3.00 + 0.00 
Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved Copyright Q 1990 Pergamon Press plc 
EXPLANATORY STYLE AND GAMBLING: 
HOW PESSIMISTS RESPOND TO LOSING WAGERS 
GORDON D. ATLAS’ and CHRISTOPHER PETERSON~ 
‘Department of Psychology, Alfred University, Alfred, NY 14802 and 
‘University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, U.S.A. 
(Received 29 June 1990) 
Summary-Fifty-three patrons of a hariless racing track completed two measures of explanatory style 
prior to an afternoon’s races. One measure assessed general explanatory style, using bad events taken 
from the Attributional Style Questionnaire, and the other measure assessed betting-specific explanatory 
style, using bad events specific to harness race betting. Subjects then kept a diary during the first 
eight races. After each race, they reported how much they had bet, whether they had won or lost, the 
major cause of the outcome, their confidence about winning future bets, and whether they were ruminating 
about past or future races. Explanatory style assessed in both ways had similar correlates. Explanatory 
style predicted the specific attributions made by subjects for losses. Pessimistic explanatory style 
(internal + stable + global attributions) predicted rumination following a lost bet, but it was unrelated to 
expressed contidence. Rumination after a loss was in turn associated with larger wagers on subsequent 
races and a tendency toward less successful wagers. These results clarify one way in which pessimistic 
explanatory style results in helplessness, and suggest a path by which problematic gambling may 
develop. 
Explanatory style is a cognitive personality variable reflecting how people habitually explain the 
causes of bad events (Peterson & Seligman, 1984). It is generally measured with the Attributional 
Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Peterson, Semmel, von Baeyer, Abramson, Metalsky & Seligman, 1982), 
which presents respondents with hypothetical bad events and asks them to provide the cause of 
the event occurring to them. Some people explain bad events by pointing to factors within 
themselves that are chronic and pervasive (e.g. “I’m a loser” whereas others explain negative 
outcomes in terms of circumscribed causes outside themselves (e.g. “It was an accident”). We refer 
to the former people as pessimistic or helpless, and to the latter as optimistic or efficacious 
.(Peterson, Seligman & Vaillant, 1988). According to theory and research, pessimistic individuals 
are more likely than their optimistic counterparts to respond with passivity and low morale to 
actual bad events. 
The initial work on explanatory style emerged from the reformulated learned helplessness model 
of depression (Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978). Much of the research on explanatory style, 
in fact, has focused on its relationship to depression (Sweeney, Anderson & Bailey, 1986). On the 
basis of a series of studies in various contexts with different populations, pessimistic explanatory 
style has been established as a risk factor for depression (Peterson C?Z Seligman, 1984). 
More recently, though, work on explanatory style has been extended in two directions. 
Researchers have begun to examine the effects of pessimistic explanatory style in various domains. 
For example, college students’ explanatory style has been shown to affect their academic 
performance, even when measures of scholastic aptitude are held constant (Peterson & Barrett, 
1987). Pessimistic individuals working in sales stay for shorter amounts of time at their jobs, and 
are less effective than their ‘optimistic’ counterparts (Seligman & Schulman, 1986). Another 
approach has been to examine the physical effects of pessimistic explanatory style. Here, pessimistic 
explanatory style has been found to be a risk factor for poor physical health (Peterson, 1988; 
Peterson & Seligman, 1987). Some evidence suggests, in fact, that one’s explanatory style may even 
have an impact upon longevity (Peterson et al., 1988). 
The reformulated learned helplessness model has assumed that these consequences of pessimistic 
explanatory style have their source in how an individual responds to uncontrollable bad events. 
Pessimists presumably respond to these situations with maladaptive passivity (Seligman, 1975). 
By viewing the bad event as both global and also stable, they enlarge the difficulty and are unable 
to rebound, whereas their optimistic counterparts respond with renewed effort and perseverance. 
523 
524 Ciom~ D. ATW and C~~~OPHER P!z~so~ 
Other theorists have proposed that the helpless person tends to ruminate following bad events, thus 
encouraging task-irrelevant thoughts which affect subsequent performance (Kuhl, 198 1). 
How pessimists actually respond to bad events, however, has thus far been largely overlooked 
in empirical studies. Much research has attended to the consequences of making certain kinds of 
characteristic attributions following hypothetical bad events without attending to the actual 
attributions made regarding actual bad events. Indeed, this has been one criticism which has been 
made regarding the reformulated helplessness model (Coyne & Gotlib, 1983). Some evidence for 
the link between hypothetical and actual attributions has been offered (Peterson, Bettes & 
Seligman, 1985; Peterson & Villanova, 1988), but the connection is crucial in establishing the 
process by which pessimism leads to negative behavioral and physical consequence and thus 
deserves further attention. 
Researchers have also only begun to trace the affective and behavioral consequences of 
experiencing bad events for the pessimist. Again, this is partly a function of the tendency to examine 
only the distal relationship between the independent variable as measured by responses to 
hypothetical bad events, and its outcomes (e.g. depression, academic performance, health). How 
does the pessimist respond to a bad event? Does helplessness lead to behavioral and affective 
paralysis? Some evidence suggests that pessimistic explanatory style influences problem-solving 
(Alloy, Peterson, Abramson & Seligman, 1984), but even this work did not examine responses to 
actual bad events. By ignoring actual bad events, researchers have in effect collapsed across 
individuals who have and have not experienced a setback, thus providing a weak test of the 
helplessness model (Peterson & Seligman, 1984). 
One further criticism which has been directed against the current body of literature on 
explanatory style has been its reliance upon college populations for its Ss. Although some of the 
work on depression has been able to demonstrate a similar relatiopship between explanatory style 
and depression in non-college samples (Sweeney et al., 1986), there is a continuing need to extend 
this research to ‘natural populations’. 
These criticisms serve as the point of departure for the study reported in the present paper. 
We attempt to improve upon typical investigations of explanatory style by addressing some of 
these traditional areas of weakness. We studied the explanatory style of individuals patronizing a 
harness racing track. Our Ss completed a measure of explanatory style before the races began, and 
then kept a race-by-race journal of their subsequent thoughts and actions. 
The benefits of this paradigm are several. Obviously, we are studying a population quite different 
from the ones from which previous samples have been drawn. Because one day of harness racing 
consists of a number of races, on which most patrons bet and on which most patrons lose, we have 
the opportunity to study the responses of Ss to a series of bad events. Following each race, 
moreover, the patrons face a task made important by the money involved: how and what to wager 
on the next race. We are thus able to examine at least a part of the subsequent decision-making 
proceess that takes place following a bad event. 
In examining the responses of Ss to bad events, we chose to focus on the possible role of 
rumination (Kuhl, 1981), both as a reaction to the bad event and in terms of its impact on 
subsequent decision-making. Pessimists should not only overgeneralize and exaggerate the 
importance of the bad event, as Beck’s cognitive theory suggests (1967), but express less confidence 
about the success of subsequent wagers, and make poor decisions in those wagers. 
One additional question of interest in the present study was whether explanatory style measures 
specifically tailored to the outcomes of interest yield stronger correlations than do general measures 
of explanatory style. No one has specifically investigated this idea, although it has been alluded 
to by Peterson and Barrett (1987), who recommended domain-specific measures in order to bolster 
predictability. In the present research, then, we measured both general explanatory style and 
horse-racing-betting-specific explanatory style. 
In sum, here are the major hypotheses to be evaluated in the present investigation. 
Hypothesis 1. Explanatory style assessed from attributions about hypothetical bad events 
predicts one’s attributions about actual bad events. 
Hypothesis 2. Pessimistic explanatory style, following a bad event (losing a bet) leads to 
helplessness, as shown by lack of confidence, rumination, and poor decisions 
regarding subsequent bets. 
Hypothesis 3. 
Subjects 
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Hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported more consistently when explanatory style is 
measured from attributions about betting events than when it is measured from 
attributions about general bad events. 
METHOD 
Fifty-three race track bettors (31 males, 22 females) participated in this study. Ss were solicited 
by a poster upon entering Jackson (Michigan) Harness Raceway on two separate occasions 
during the summer of 1987. They were offered $10 to complete the study. The average S was 43 yr 
of age, and reported attending harness racing 39 times per year, bringing $80 on each occasion. 
The average S claimed that he or she usually broke even or came out ahead after a day of gambling. 
(Present data suggests this to be an exaggeration.) Ss did not come to the racetrack in order to 
participate in the study. Rather, they attended to bet and only decided to serve as a S once they 
noticed our poster. 
Procedure 
S was given a booklet containing a brief demographic questionnaire, a short version of the 
Attributional Style Questionnaire, a measure developed for the present research dubbed the Betting 
Attributional Style Questionnaire (BASQ), and a Response to Race Outcome Diary containing one 
page for each of the first eight races of the afternoon. 
The demographic measure, the ASQ, and the BASQ were completed prior to the beginning of 
the first race. The appropriate questions of the Response to Race Outcome Diary were completed 
following each of the first eight races. After the eighth race, Ss returned the diary to the researchers 
and were paid $10. 
Measures 
ASQ. The version of the Attributional Style Questionnaire used in this study was identical to 
the usual measure (Peterson et al., 1982), except that only four hypothetical bad events (and no 
good events) were included (see Table 1). For each event, S, were asked to imagine that it had 
happened to them and to provide in writing the ‘one major cause’ of this event if it were to happen. 
Ss are then asked to rate this cause on 7-point scales according to its internality (= 7) vs externality 
(= l), stability (= 7) vs instability (= l), and globality (=7) vs specificity (= 1). 
Higher scores-indicating internal, stable, and global attributions-were regarded as pessimistic 
and lower scores as optimistic. Following convention, scores for a given S were averaged across 
events and across dimensions. The reliability of the ASQ in the present sample, estimated by 
Cronbach’s (1951) coefficient a, was 0.68. Its mean was 3.91, and its standard deviation was 1 .Ol. 
BASQ. The Betting Attributional Style Questionnaire was strictly parallel to the ASQ except 
that the four hypothetical bad events used were specific to betting on harness races (again see 
Table 1). The reliability of this measure in the present sample, estimated by Cronbach’s (1951) 
coefficient a, was 0.78. Its mean was 3.79, and its standard deviation was 1.15. 
Response to race outcome diary. This diary asked the same questions about each of the first 
eight races of the afternoon. First, Ss specified the amount of their bet and whether they won 
or lost it. 
Second, Ss were asked to provide the cause for the race turning out as it did (won or loss). 
Following the format of the ASQ and the BASQ, Ss rated the attributed cause on 7-point scales 
Table 1. Hypothetical bad events comprising the ASQ and BASQ 
On the Aftributiod Style Questionnaire (ASQ) 
(1) You have been looking for a job unsuccessfully for some time. 
(2) A friend comes to you with a problem, and you do not try to help. 
(3) You can not get all the work done that others cxpcct of you. 
(4) You meet a friend who acts hostilely to you. 
On the Betting Attributiomd Style Questionnaire (BASQ) 
(I) Your horse stays on the rail the whole race and loses. 
(2) One horse appears to be 2 set faster than the other horses in a race. You bet on the horse, and he loses. 
(3) You lost the first live bets of the night. 
(4) You follow a tip and lose big. 
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Table 2. Correlations between explanatory style and actual attributions followinn losinn races 
RXCS 
Explanatory style I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Composite 
ASQ 0.34. 0.32 0.47.. 0.18 0.45.. 0.34. 0.05 0.07 0.44“ 
BASQ 0.44** 0.25 0.21 0.27 0.18 0.27 -0.04 0.41. 0.37.’ 
AS0 and BASO 0.42.. 0.30 0.38. 0.24 0.36. 0.35’ 0.00 0.49.. 0.45.‘ 
‘P < 0.05; l *p < 0.01. 
corresponding to its internality vs externality and to its stability vs instability. Because stability and 
globality ratings prove highly redundant (Peterson, Villanova & Raps, 1985), we chose not to ask 
about the globality of the attributed cause, in order to reduce respondent burden. 
Third, Ss rated their confidence in winning money on the next race on a 7-point scale (1 = not 
at all and 7 = a great deal). Fourth, Ss used 7-point scales to report the degree they were thinking 
about past races and the degree they were thinking about future races (1 = not at all and 7 = a 
great deal). These scores comprised our measure of rumination. 
RESULTS 
Here is an overview of the results. Explanatory style assessed from attributions about 
hypothetical bad events indeed predicted actual attributions for losing wagers. Pessimistic 
explanatory style predicted rumination following a lost bet, but it did not relate to expressed 
confidence. Rumination following a loss was in turn correlated with larger wagers on subsequent 
races and somewhat with decreased success at these wagers. General explanatory style and 
betting-specific explanatory style showed the same pattern of correlates. 
Strategy of analysis. The ASQ and the BASQ were highly correlated (r = 0.70, P < O.OOOl), at 
about the level of the reliabilities of these measures, suggesting that these were not measuring 
distinct aspects of explanatory style. Nonetheless, in view of Hypothesis 3, correlations for both 
measures will be reported throughout, along with correlations involving a composite measure of 
the two (mean = 3.85, SD = 0.98, a = 0.83). 
Because the helplessness predictions are most relevant following a bad event, it was important 
to analyze Ss’ responses only for races in which they had made a losing bet. For any given 
race, however, some Ss did make a winning bet, which reduced the degrees of freedom to an 
unsatisfactory number. Composite measures were thus calculated for the responses in the diary that 
followed a loss by averaging these across the appropriate items. For instance, if a S made a losing 
bet on the first, third, fifth, and seventh races, then scores were formed by averaging across diary 
entries following these four races only. Every S lost at least two bets, and the range of losses was 
between 2 and 8 (averaging 5.25). 
Testing the hypotheses. Table 2 shows the correlations between explanatory style and the actual 
attributions made by Ss for races they lost. Note that these were generally significant, showing that 
explanatory style as measured from hypothetical events predicts actual explanations for bad events. 
Hypothesis 1 was, generally, supported. 
How did explanatory style relate to the other measures from the diary? Table 3 shows that 
pessimistic explanatory style was linked as predicted to rumination following a loss, but was 
unrelated to confidence or success at future betting. Pessimists tended to focus on past races 
(r = 0.31, P < 0.01) as well as future races 0. = 0.26, P < 0.05) following a loss. ‘Thinking about 
past races’ and ‘thinking about future races’ were themselves very highly correlated (r = 0.49, 
P < O.OOl), supporting our decision to combine them to produce our measure of rumination. 
Although there was no overall relationship between explanatory style and subsequent betting 
(although a trend in the predicted direction did emerge), analysis of the results for individual races 
Table 3. Correlations between explanatory style and responses to losing wagers 
Rumination 
Explanatory style past Future Composite Confidence Success of next bet 
ASQ 0.31’ 0.26’ 0.33’. -0.07 -0.17 
BASO 0.27’ 0.20 0.27’ 0.09 -0.14 
ASQ god BASQ 0.32’ 0.25’ 0.33.’ 0.02 -0.17 
l fJ < 0.05; 0-p c 0.01. 
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Table 4. Correlations between rumination following a loss and 
subxauent decision-makina 
Rumination Amount of bet success of bet 
About past 
About future 




l P < 0.05. 
did reveal two intriguing findings. Following a losing bet in race three, Ss with a pessimistic 
explanatory style were more likely to bet more on race four than those with an ‘optimistic’ style 
(r = 0.45, P < 0.004). After losing their wager in race five, pessimistic Ss were more likely to lose 
their bet on race six (r = 0.37, P < 0.02). A trend in which pessimism leads to poor decision-making 
following a bad event was thus at least suggested in our data. 
When rumination following a loss was correlated with betting and winning on subsequent races, 
an interesting pattern emerged (Table 4). Ruminators tended to bet more money following a loss 
(r = 0.28, P < 0.05), and were also somewhat less likely to win these bets (r = -0.21, P < 0.10). 
These results are ambiguous, though, because of our strategy of forming composite scores by 
collapsing across the eight races. We wish to argue that rumination /earls to poor decision-making, 
but the obtained correlations may show merely that losing large bets on early races leads to 
rumination after later races. 
To examine this alternative account, we analyzed the relationship between rumination and 
subsequent betting on a race-by-race basis. Although not all of these correlations attained statistical 
significance (because of the reduced degrees of freedom), in these individual cases the pattern was 
the same as we found for the composite measures: rumination was correlated with larger wagers 
but reduced success. And in these cases we know that the direction of the correlation had to lead 
from rumination to betting. 
Hypothesis 3 was not supported. For the most part, the ASQ and BASQ had correlates of similar 
magnitude. The only exceptions were the results just described for betting and losing, where the 
BASQ predicted slightly better than the ASQ. 
DISCUSSION 
The present results support the reformulated learned helplessness model and extend what we 
know about people’s responses to bad events in four important ways. First, explanatory style 
assessed from attributions about hypothetical events indeed predicts the actual attributions that 
people offer for bad events. Note that we measured actual attributions for several actual bad events 
(cf. Peterson et al., 1985), doubtlessly boosting the reliability of the resulting scores through 
aggregation (cf. Epstein, 1980). 
Second, the ASQ and the BASQ had similar correlates, showing that the particular events used 
to elicit explanatory style are less critical than had been previously thought (Peterson & Barrett, 
1987). Researchers can thus feel more confident about using the ‘generic’ ASQ without tailoring 
it explicitly to the outcomes of interest. 
Third, pessimistic explanatory style was associated with increased rumination following a loss, 
and increased rumination in turn was associated with poor decision-making, as shown by increased 
wagering yet decreased winning. This pattern of findings supports the argument by Kuhl (1981) 
that helplessness involves extraneous thoughts. 
Pessimists, we speculate, are seemingly distracting themselves by ruminating about past races 
rather than directing their attention to the task at hand. Why would a focus on future races also 
be considered rumination? Several reasons lead us to believe that this is the case. Focusing on 
‘future races’ rather than the one which is about to occur can be conceptualized as a distracting 
cognitive activity. Also, the two measures are, again, highly correlated, thus leading us to believe 
that they represent a single factor (of rumination). Finally, pessimists viewed the bad events as 
stable-meaning that they might expect subsequent races to have similar negative outcomes. 
The focus on future races, then, may have been with the thought that this (bad event) will 
probably recur, thus representing another form of rumination. 
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Fourth, perhaps explanatory style warrants further study by clinical psychologists interested in 
‘compulsive’ gambling. We have no way of knowing if any of our Ss had a problem with excessive 
betting, but certainly these results imply a path by which gambling problems might result. 
If pessimists tend to ruminate following losses, and rumination tends to lead to larger and more 
unsuccessful bets following losses, this could create a vicious circle from which escape may be 
difficult. 
Limitations of the study exist and must be acknowledged. The results are correlational and 
perhaps third variables confound some of the patterns we report. Although our design began as 
longitudinal, the necessity to boost degrees of freedom for analyses necessitated the collapsing of 
measures across the eight races, resulting in cross-sectional data. Finally, our study was still not 
as fine-grained as needed to glimpse closely at the cognitive processes by which helplessness is 
produced in pessimists but not optimists. For instance, we did not ask our Ss to specify the aspects 
of past and future races about which they were ruminating, leaving us to speculate about the 
content of those ‘ruminations’. We do not understand the significance of the ‘no finding’ concerning 
expressed confidence. We also did not ascertain the odds of their wagers. It is our suspicion that 
‘ruminators’ made riskier decisions (betting on longer odds horses) because their rate of success 
was lower, following losing races. 
There is one puzzle concerning the entire pattern of results. ‘Helplessness’ was arguably present 
in the form of impaired decision-making, but the pessimistic bettors were just as likely as the 
optimists to continue to bet. One might expect those with a pessimistic explanatory style to stop 
betting altogether after a loss, to withdraw-but this did not occur. Perhaps a solution to this puzzle 
can be derived from research literature on animal helplessness, where it is found that passivity 
following a bad event occurs only when an effortful response is required (Maier & Seli_gman, 1976). 
Perhaps making one more bet at a race track for a habitual bettor does not require enough effort 
to produce a behavioral passivity that one might expect in pessimists. Another hint comes from 
our own data; pessimists did not lose confidence following a loss, so why would they withdraw 
from betting? This suggests that the behavior might have been so habitual for our Ss that a 
complete withdrawal from the activity would not be expected. 
In sum, we investigated explanatory style among patrons of a harness racing track. The way they 
habitually explained bad events predicted the actual explanations they offered for lost wagers. 
Pessimistic explanatory style predicted rumination about races, which in turn was related to poor 
decision-making in regard to subsequent races. These results extend and clarify the reformulation 
of the learned helplessness model in several ways, and suggest a possible path by which excessive 
gambling could develop. 
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